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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 ne of the most intriguing and important discussions in international law 
today is the potential impact of emerging technologies on the law of armed 
conflict (LOAC). This conversation has developed in many ways and in 
many fora, including academic journals and conferences, statements by gov-
ernments, and assertions by nongovernmental organizations. Among those 
discussions, perhaps the most significant has taken place between States and 
other invited participants as part of the meetings of States Parties to the 
Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW).1 
Adopted in 1980, this Convention2 has provided an active forum for 
member States to consider the application of weapons in armed conflict and 
has produced several important protocols limiting the use of various means 
and methods of warfare.3 In 2013, the States Parties turned their attention to 
emerging technologies,4 including lethal autonomous weapons and artificial 
intelligence.5 While these discussions have not resulted in an additional pro-
tocol or even a consensus approach on how to address these challenges, the 
discussions have provided an invaluable perspective on national approaches 
to the application of the LOAC to these technologies. 
Because one of the likely characteristics of these advanced weapons 
would be the ability to make decisions implicating life and death on the bat-
                                                                                                                      
1. See David Kaye & Steven A. Solomon, The Second Review Conference of the 1980 Conven-
tion on Certain Conventional Weapons, 96 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNAL LAW 992 (2002). 
2. Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional 
Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate 
Effects, Oct. 10, 1980, 1342 U.N.T.S. 137. 
3. Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and 
Other Devices as Amended on 3 May 1996, May 3, 1996, 2048 U.N.T.S. 93; Protocol on 
Blinding Laser Weapons, Oct. 13, 1995, 1380 U.N.T.S. 370; Protocol on Explosive Rem-
nants of War to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Con-
ventional Weapons Which May be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indis-
criminate Effects, Nov. 28, 2003, 2399 U.N.T.S. 100; Convention on Cluster Munitions, 
May 30, 2008, 2688 U.N.T.S. 39. 
4. See Meeting of the High Contracting Parties to the Convention on Prohibitions or 
Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May be Deemed to Be 
Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, Final Report, ¶ 32, U.N. Doc. 
CCW/MSP/2013/10 (Dec. 16, 2013). 
5. See Chris Jenks, The Gathering Swarm: The Path to Increasingly Autonomous Weapons Sys-
tems, 57 JURIMETRICS JOURNAL 341 (2017). 
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tlefield, these discussions have highlighted a fundamental question concern-
ing the LOAC: does the law regulating armed conflict require human input 
in selecting and engaging targets or can that decision be made without hu-
man input? For Parties to Additional Protocol I to the 1949 Geneva Con-
ventions (AP I),6 this question might be formulated as whether the law is 
designed to provide the “best application possible” of the LOAC or the 
“best application humanly possible”? Put differently, are humans an integral 
part of LOAC application such that future weapons must, as a matter of law, 
incorporate human input into lethal decision making or does the possibility 
that advanced technology may produce fewer LOAC violations than humans 
in the same circumstances allow, or even require, States to pursue the devel-
opment of these technologies for selecting and engaging targets? 
Recent discussions have varied widely on this topic, including many 
voices that argue “meaningful human control” should be a necessary element 
of any research and development on advanced weapon systems that would 
have the capability of lethal decision making.7 At least some of those voices 
argue that the requirement for human decision making is a legal requirement 
and comes from the LOAC.8 
In contrast, this article argues that international law is currently unclear 
on this point and therefore does not require a human decision for selecting 
and engaging targets to be legal. Rather, the law requires that the targeting 
decision maker, whether a human, machine, or human-machine team, be 
able to apply fully and comply with the LOAC. Even in its strictest applica-
tion, potentially applicable to Parties to AP I, the LOAC requires the deci-
sion maker to “minimiz[e] incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians 
and damage to civilian objects.”9 Thus, to the extent that weapon systems 
                                                                                                                      
6. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to 
the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 
[hereinafter AP I]. 
7. See, e.g., Merel Ekelhof, Autonomous Weapons: Operationalizing Meaningful Human Control, 
HUMANITARIAN LAW & POLICY (Aug. 15, 2018), https://blogs.icrc.org/law-and-policy/ 
2018/08/15/autonomous-weapons-operationalizing-meaningful-human-control/. 
8. Netta Goussac, Safety Net or Tangled Web: Legal Reviews of AI in Weapons and War-
Fighting, HUMANITARIAN LAW & POLICY (Apr. 18, 2019), https://blogs.icrc.org/law-and-
policy/2019/04/18/safety-net-tangled-web-legal-reviews-ai-weapons-war-fighting/; Inter-
national Committee of the Red Cross, Towards Limits on Autonomy in Weapon Systems, 
Statement to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) Group of Govern-
mental Experts on Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems (Apr. 9, 2018), https: 
//www.icrc.org/en/document/towards-limits-autonomous-weapons [hereinafter ICRC, 
Towards Limits on Autonomy in Weapons Systems]. 
9. AP I, supra note 6, art. 57(2)(a)(ii). 
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use technological advances, such as machine learning or artificial intelligence, 
to select and engage targets, those systems must be capable of fully applying 
the LOAC, including minimizing civilian deaths and injury and damage to 
civilian objects. 
Further, it naturally follows that if weapon systems using technological 
advances can make decisions that are LOAC compliant then there is no legal 
proscription to their employment on the battlefield. Because the future ca-
pabilities of machine learning and artificial intelligence are still an open ques-
tion, those technologies should be researched and developed with the po-
tential of being fully implemented by States. In addition, to the extent that 
such systems become consistently better at implementing LOAC provisions 
than humans, States should be required, to the extent feasible, to procure 
and employ such systems. 
In making this argument, the article focuses on state practice. Because 
States are the primary actors in the international community and their prac-
tice among the most important sources of international law, it is their state-
ments and actions that should capture our attention. 
A few caveats before proceeding. This article does not address ethical10 
or technological considerations concerning the use of autonomous weapon 
systems. It recognizes that States can limit the use of machine learning or 
artificial intelligence in the use of force based on such considerations if they 
choose to do so.11 These limiting actions, as well as other options, are cer-
tainly available if States are inclined to take such actions.12 However, in the 
                                                                                                                      
10. For one view of some of these ethical considerations, see INTERNATIONAL COM-
MITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, ETHICS AND AUTONOMOUS WEAPON SYSTEMS: AN ETHICAL 
BASIS FOR HUMAN CONTROL? (2018) [hereinafter ICRC, ETHICS AND AUTONOMOUS 
WEAPON SYSTEMS]. For example, the ICRC argues, “It is precisely anxiety about the loss 
of human control over weapon systems and the use of force that goes beyond questions of 
the compatibility of autonomous weapon systems with our laws to encompass fundamental 
questions of acceptability to our values.” Id. at 1. 
11. See Elke Schwarz, The (Im)Possibility of Meaningful Human Control for Lethal Autonomous 
Weapon Systems, HUMANITARIAN LAW & POLICY (Aug. 29, 2018), https://blogs.icrc. 
org/law-and-policy/2018/08/29/im-possibility-meaningful-human-control-lethal-autono-
mous-weapon-systems/ (“[W]e should avoid conflating the legal concept with the possibil-
ity to retain moral agency for life and death decisions with LAWS.”). 
12. For example, the ICRC states,  
It is clear that ethical decisions by States, and by society at large, have preceded and moti-
vated the development of new international legal constraints in warfare, and that in the face 
of new developments not specifically foreseen or not clearly addressed by existing law, con-
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absence of such actions, nothing in the current LOAC precludes developing 
and employing weapons systems that use machine learning or artificial intel-
ligence to select and engage targets. 
With these points in mind, this article proceeds as follows. Part II briefly 
demonstrates the potential issues that emerging technologies may have on 
the application of the LOAC by presenting States with weapon systems ca-
pable of applying lethal force with limited or no human interaction. Part III 
describes various views on the legal requirement of human involvement in 
the LOAC, with particular attention to State positions as announced in the 
discussions by States Party to the 1980 CCW. This Part also describes na-
tional measures, such as weapons review processes that are already in place 
and can continue to be used to adjudicate the legality of weapons using ma-
chine learning and artificial intelligence. Part IV will argue that it is entirely 
too early to determine whether these technologies may or may not be able 
to eventually apply force in a way that reduces civilian casualties and LOAC 
violations. Declaring them unlawful now would prevent States from re-
searching and developing technologies that may lead to greater LOAC com-
pliance. Such action would certainly not result in long-term benefits to po-
tential participants in, and victims of, armed conflict. Part V concludes. 
 
II. THE RISE OF TECHNOLOGY 
 
Throughout history, emerging technologies have had a significant impact on 
the conduct of hostilities. The development of the longbow, gunpowder, and 
mechanized warfare are examples of how advances in weapon systems and 
accompanying tactics can be the difference between victory and defeat.13 Of-
ten, as new technologies emerge, calls for their ban or the creation of signif-
icant legal restraints on their development quickly follow.14 Key examples 
include efforts to ban or restrain the use of gunpowder, the hot air balloon, 
submarines, nuclear weapons, and cyber tools. In some cases, these bans or 
                                                                                                                      
temporary ethical concerns can go beyond what is already codified in the law. This high-
lights the importance of not reducing debates about autonomous weapon systems, or other 
new technologies of warfare, solely to legal compliance. 
ICRC, ETHICS AND AUTONOMOUS WEAPON SYSTEMS, supra note 10, at 5 (emphasis omit-
ted). 
13. See Eric Talbot Jensen, Emerging Technologies and LOAC Signaling, 91 INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW STUDIES 621 (2015). 
14. See Sean Watts, Regulation-Tolerant Weapons, Regulation-Resistant Weapons and Law of 
War Development, 91 INTERNATIONAL LAW STUDIES 540 (2015). 
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restrictions were sought because of the alleged inability of the new weapons 
to comply with existing rules of armed conflict. 
Generally, these cries of alarm have proven unfounded. Rather, States 
have taken a cautious and deliberate approach to the research and develop-
ment of weapons based on emerging technologies and ensured that the 
weapons were employed in compliance with the LOAC.15 In the end, all of 
these emerging technologies were found to be capable of LOAC compliance 
and have been properly employed in armed conflict. Unfortunately, we are 
once again repeating this unhelpful process with emerging weapon systems 
based on automation, robotics, bio-enhancement, and artificial intelligence. 
Here, the proposed ban on “killer robots” provides the best example.16 
As with earlier weapon systems based on emerging technologies, there is 
clearly a need for an open and frank discussion among States and caution as 
research, particularly weaponization, progresses.17 The potential significance 
of these technologies applied to weapons is immense. For example, Russian 
President Vladimir Putin has recently stated, “Artificial intelligence is the fu-
ture, not only for Russia, but for all humankind. It comes with colossal op-
portunities, but also threats that are difficult to predict. Whoever becomes 
the leader in this sphere will become the ruler of the world.”18 
As with earlier translations of emerging technologies into weapons, it is 
premature to ban emerging weapon systems based on existing legal con-
straints. Paul Scharre has rightly stated, “even the most thoughtful regula-
                                                                                                                      
15. For example, in the CCW discussions, the Netherlands stated, “As long as autono-
mous weapon systems remain under meaningful human control, there is no reason to as-
sume that by definition these weapons fall into one of the categories of weapons that are 
banned under international law.” Statement of the Netherlands delivered by Reint Vogelaar, 
First Secretary, Permanent Representation of the Kingdom of the Netherlands to the Con-
ference on Disarmament at Group of Experts on LAWS, Apr. 26, 2019, https://www. 
unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/(httpAssets)/A2E0497EE93C232AC12583CB0037813B/
$file/5a+NL+Statement+Legal+Challenges-final.pdf [hereinafter Statement of the Neth-
erlands]. 
16. See CAMPAIGN TO STOP KILLER ROBOTS, https://www.stopkillerrobots.org/ (last 
visited Mar. 2, 2020). 
17. For an excellent discussion of a much broader application of autonomy to weapon 
systems, see Chris Jenks & Rain Liivoja, Machine Autonomy and the Constant Care Obligation, 
HUMANITARIAN LAW & POLICY (Dec. 11, 2018), https://blogs.icrc.org/law-and-policy/ 
2018/12/11/machine-autonomy-constant-care-obligation/. 
18. Whoever Leads in AI Will Rule the World: Putin to Russian Children on Knowledge Day, RT 
(Sept. 1, 2017), https://www.rt.com/news/401731-ai-rule-world-putin/. 
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tions or prohibitions will not be able to foresee all of the ways that autono-
mous weapons could evolve over time.”19 The United Kingdom has advo-
cated the same view,20 which is true both in negative and positive applica-
tions, making clarity in the legal arguments especially important. History and 
reason dictate that the international community should take a cautious ap-
proach in placing limitations beyond existing LOAC constraints on the de-
velopment and employment of advanced technologies. 
An additional difficulty with current calls for a ban is the definitional 
uncertainty inherent in the discussion. As articulated by Chris Jenks, there is 
no consensus on the meaning and use of the terms “autonomy” and “artifi-
cial intelligence,” even within the CCW process.21 As Jenks notes, “The in-
ternational community cannot even agree about what they disagree about.”22 
The Polish delegation echoed this view in the CCW discussions.23 
                                                                                                                      
19. Paul Scharre, Human Judgment and Lethal Decision-Making in War, HUMANITARIAN 
LAW & POLICY (Apr. 11, 2018), https://blogs.icrc.org/law-and-policy/2018/04/11/hu-
man-judgment-lethal-decision-making-war/. 
20. UK Mission Geneva, Statement at Meeting of Group of Governmental Experts on 
Emerging Technologies in the Area of Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems, Mar. 25–29, 
2019, https://www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/(httpAssets)/1ED3972D40AE53B5C 
12583D3003F8E5E/$file/20190318-5(a)_IHL_Statement.pdf [hereinafter UK Statement]. 
We further contend that in the absence of any clearly articulated empirical evidence as to 
why existing regulation—including IHL—is inadequate to control developments in emerg-
ing technologies, the issue may well lie not with the processes themselves, but with the 
perceived ability of machines to assimilate, understand and meet the relevant extant legal 
and ethical standards. We argue that weapons systems that cannot meet these standards will 
remain incapable of legal use as set out in existing national and international normative 
frameworks and will not be developed, fielded and used. All states should look to ensure 
they meet the basic obligations already set out in the relevant articles of IHL before pressing 
for bespoke legislation for as-yet undefined capabilities. 
21. Chris Jenks, False Rubicons, Moral Panic, and Conceptual Cul-De-Sacs: Critiquing & Re-
framing the Call to Ban Lethal Autonomous Weapons, 44 PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW 1, 12 (2016) 
[hereinafter Jenks, False Rubicons]; see also Chris Jenks, The Distraction of Full Autonomy and the 
Need to Refocus the CCW LAWS Discussion on Critical Functions (SMU Dedman School of Law 
Legal Studies Research Paper No. 314, 2016), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? 
abstract_id=2797247. 
22. Jenks, False Rubicons, supra note 21, at 12; see also Heather M. Roff & Richard Moyes, 
Meaningful Human Control, Artificial Intelligence and Autonomous Weapons 1 (Briefing Paper for 
Delegates at the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) Meeting of Experts 
on Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems (LAWS), 2016), http://www.article36.org/wp-
content/uploads/2016/04/MHC-AI-and-AWS-FINAL.pdf. 
23. Statement of the Delegation of Poland: General Comments, 2019 Group of Gov-
ernmental Experts on Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems (LAWS), Mar. 25, 2019, at 1, 
https://www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/(httpAssets)/5CAD5A1367E305A5C12583
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Given the disparate and uneven nature of criticism, most critics of au-
tonomous weapons have focused their attention on the issue of selecting and 
engaging targets without human input.24 They argue that the process of se-
lecting and engaging targets is an inherently human process, requiring human 
direction. Some argue that it is a requirement of the law of armed conflict. It 
is to this question that this article will now turn. 
 
III. THE REQUIREMENT OF HUMAN INVOLVEMENT 
 
This Part catalogs the calls for a legal requirement for human involvement 
in the target selection and engagement process.25 It will look at representative 
                                                                                                                      
CC004CA205/$file/1.+GGE_LAWS_March+2019_PL+Statement_General+com-
ments_25.03.2019.pdf (“Poland is of the opinion that we need definition or at least key 
characteristics of LAWS to allow regulation of the use of this kind of technology with es-
tablished levels of human control policy.”). 
24. For example, the ICRC has stated, “From the ICRC’s perspective, the focus must 
be on the functions of weapon systems that are most relevant to legal obligations and ethical 
concerns within the scope of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, namely 
autonomy in the critical functions of selecting and attacking targets.” ICRC, Towards Limits 
on Autonomy in Weapons Systems, supra note 8. 
25. Perhaps the most articulate argument for a legal requirement for human control in 
armed conflict has come from the ICRC. In a recent statement, the ICRC stated: 
For conflict parties, human control over AI [artificial intelligence] and machine-learning 
applications employed as means and methods of warfare is required to ensure compliance 
with the law. The rules of international humanitarian law are addressed to humans. It is 
humans that comply with and implement the law, and it is humans who will be held ac-
countable for violations. In particular, combatants have a unique obligation to make the 
judgements required of them by the international humanitarian law rules governing the con-
duct of hostilities, and this responsibility cannot be transferred to a machine, a piece of 
software or an algorithm. 
These rules require context-specific judgements to be taken by those who plan, decide upon 
and carry out attacks to ensure: distinction—between military objectives, which may law-
fully be attacked, and civilians or civilian objects, which must not be attacked; proportion-
ality—in terms of ensuring that the incidental civilian harm expected from an attack will not 
be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated; and to 
enable precautions in attack – so that risks to civilians can be further minimized. 
Where AI systems are used in attacks—whether as part of physical or cyber-weapon sys-
tems, or in decision-support systems—their design and use must enable combatants to 
make these judgements. 
INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND 
MACHINE LEARNING IN ARMED CONFLICT: A HUMAN-CENTRED APPROACH 7, 8 
(2019), https://blogs.icrc.org/new-delhi/wp-content/uploads/sites/93/2019/06/ai_ 
and_machine_learning_in_armed_conflict-icrc-1.pdf. [hereinafter ICRC, ARTIFICIAL 
INTELLIGENCE AND MACHINE LEARNING IN ARMED CONFLICT]. 
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arguments for human involvement, including the potential difficulty of es-
tablishing accountability with an autonomous system and such systems’ po-
tential lack of predictability. It also discusses how the legally required weap-
ons review process might affect these objections. Finally, while describing 
the views of a broad range of actors, it focuses on what States have said on 
the role of human involvement with respect to the legality of autonomous 
weapons since it is States that make international law. 
 
A. What Law Applies 
 
The starting point for the analysis of the legal requirements for employment 
of weapons that use machine learning or artificial intelligence is the determi-
nation that the LOAC applies. That it applies is mostly uncontested, at least 
by the States engaged in the discussions at the CCW meetings. 26 This legal 
                                                                                                                      
With respect to autonomous weapon systems, the CCW States Party have recognized 
that “human responsibility” for the use of weapon systems and the use of force “must be 
retained.” Group of Governmental Experts of the High Contracting Parties to the Conven-
tion on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which 
May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, Report of 
the 2018 Session of the Group of Governmental Experts on Emerging Technologies in the 
Area of Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems ¶¶ 21(b), 23(f), U.N. Doc. 
CCW/GGE.1/2018/3 (Oct. 23, 2018).  
Many States, international organizations (including the ICRC), and civil society organ-
izations, have stressed the requirement for human control to ensure compliance with inter-
national humanitarian law and compatibility with ethical values. See, for example, Contribu-
tions from Non-Governmental Actors, 2019 Group of Governmental Experts on Lethal 
Autonomous Weapons Systems (LAWS), https://www.unog.ch/80256EE600585943/(ht 
tpPages)/5535B644C2AE8F28C1258433002BBF14?OpenDocument (last visited Mar. 2, 
2020). 
Beyond the use of force and targeting, the potential use of artificial intelligence systems 
for other decisions governed by specific rules of international humanitarian law, such as 
detention, will require careful consideration of necessary human control and judgment. See, 
e.g., Tess Bridgeman, The Viability of Data-Reliant Predictive Systems in Armed Conflict Detention, 
HUMANITARIAN LAW & POLICY (Apr. 8, 2019), https://blogs.icrc.org/law-and-policy/ 
2019/04/08/viability-data-reliant-predictive-systems-armed-conflict-detention. 
26. See, e.g., Statement by Brazil, 2019 Group of Governmental Experts on Lethal Au-
tonomous Weapons Systems (LAWS), Mar. 25–29, 2019, at 1–2, https://www.unog.ch/ 
80256EDD006B8954/(httpAssets)/122DF2DAEE334DDBC12583CC003EFD6F/$file/
Brazil+GGE+LAWS+2019+-+Item+5+a+-+IHL.pdf [hereinafter Statement by Brazil]; 
Statement of the Netherlands, supra note 15; Statement of the Delegation of Poland, supra 
note 23; EU Statement, Group of Governmental Experts, Lethal Autonomous Weapons 
Systems, Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, Geneva, 25–29 March 2019, 
https://www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/(httpAssets)/EA84B3C2340F877DC12583
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conclusion is not, of course, insignificant, particularly in light of the lack of 
formal agreement on that issue concerning cyber weapons among the mem-
bers of the United Nations Group of Governmental Experts. The ac-
ceptance of this legal determination at least identifies the legal paradigm 
upon which to discuss the lawfulness of various weapon systems. Further, 
accepting that the LOAC governs the application of these weapons systems 
also establishes the basis for States to determine the role of humans and 
human decision making in the employment of weapons that use machine 
learning or artificial intelligence. 
It is also important to note the role of States as decisionmakers on 
LOAC questions, and particularly on this issue of human involvement. As 
stated recently by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), 
 
What is clear is that military applications of new and emerging technologies 
are not inevitable. They are choices made by States, which must be within 
the bounds of existing rules, and take into account potential humanitarian 
consequences for civilians and for combatants no longer taking part in hos-
tilities, as well as broader considerations of “humanity” and “public con-
science.”27 
 
                                                                                                                      
CB003727F3/$file/ALIGNED+-+LAWS+GGE+EU+statement+IHL.pdf [hereinafter 
EU Statement]; ICRC, ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND MACHINE LEARNING IN ARMED 
CONFLICT, supra note 25, at 2. 
27. ICRC, ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND MACHINE LEARNING IN ARMED CON-
FLICT, supra note 25, at 2. It is important to note that for support of its use of the terms 
“humanity” and “public conscience,” the ICRC references a paragraph from the 1977 Ad-
ditional Protocols to the 1949 Geneva Conventions known as the Martens clause (which 
originated in the preamble to the 1899 and 1907 Hague Conventions). See AP I, supra note 
6, art. 1(2); Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949, and Relat-
ing to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts pmbl., June 8, 1977, 
1125 U.N.T.S. 609. The U.S. Law of War Manual notes, “The Martens clause reflects the idea 
that when no specific rule applies, the principles of the law of war form the general guide 
for conduct during war.” OFFICE OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DE-
FENSE, LAW OF WAR MANUAL § 19.8.3 (rev. ed., Dec. 2016) [hereinafter DOD LAW OF WAR 
MANUAL]. Further, Paul Ney recently stated with respect to the Martens clause, “addressing 
novel legal issues is less a matter of creating new principles or filling in ‘gaps’ in the law of 
war, than in explaining and clarifying how the existing principles of the law of war already 
apply to new situations.” Paul C. Ney Jr., General Counsel, U.S. Department of Defense, 
Keynote Address at the Israel Defense Forces 3rd International Conference on the Law of 
Armed Conflict (May 28, 2019), https://www.lawfareblog.com/defense-department-gen-
eral-counsel-remarks-idf-conference [hereinafter Ney, Keynote Address]. 
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Not only do States make choices about employing weapon systems, but they 
also are the primary determiners of the legality of employing such weapons 
and of the requirement (or not) of human involvement in that employment. 
The recent statement of U.S. Department of Defense General Counsel 
Paul C. Ney reinforced the primacy of States to make international law.28 But 
while States make international law, other perspectives, such as those offered 
by nongovernmental organizations, play an important role in shaping the 
discussion and informing States on important issues.29 Nonetheless, it is ul-
timately States that make international law and therefore States that should 
be the focus of this analysis. 
 
B. Applying the Law of Armed Conflict 
 
Given the general acceptance that the LOAC applies and that State views on 
the LOAC are preeminent, there are two main arguments cloaked in LOAC 
terms leveled against weapon systems that use machine learning or artificial 
intelligence to select and engage targets—the lack of accountability for vio-
lations of the LOAC and the unpredictability of the current application of 
machine learning or artificial intelligence with respect to targeting. Each is 
discussed below. 
                                                                                                                      
28. Ney stated: 
First, international law is law made by States and for States. Other actors, such as nongov-
ernmental organizations (NGOs) and academics, can play an important role, but States have 
the primary responsibility for developing and implementing international law.  
Second, the law of war must be made, in particular, by States that conduct military opera-
tions. The law of war is, foremost, law that is implemented by armed forces during military 
operations. States that actually conduct military operations have critical expertise and a per-
spective that are essential in these discussions. 
A State like Israel is on the vanguard of addressing challenges in the law of war. Israel was 
the first to develop reconnaissance UAVs and deploy reactive tank armor, and pioneered 
Iron Dome. Israel has also had exceptional experience in combatting terrorism, in fighting 
enemies that deliberately hide behind innocents and defy the law of war. 
Third, discussions on the law of war also need to be led by States, like Israel and others 
represented here, that are deeply committed to the rule of law and will adhere in good faith 
to their legal obligations. A State that has no intention of complying with its obligations will 
not have the desire that Israel and the United States and others have, to ensure that the law 
is militarily practical and strengthens humanitarian protections. 
Ney, Keynote Address, supra note 27.  
29. Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055, 33 
U.N.T.S. 993; see also Alain Pellet, Article 38, in THE STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL 
COURT OF JUSTICE: A COMMENTARY 731–870 (Andreas Zimmermann, Christian Tomus-
chat, Karin Oellers-Frahm & Christian J. Tams eds., 2d. ed., 2012). 
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C. Accountability 
 
Individual criminal responsibility is an important aspect of enforcing inter-
national law. The formation of international courts and tribunals, including 
the International Criminal Court,30 is designed to decrease the impunity with 
which some military leaders and armed forces members conduct their mili-
tary operations. When a human is not present in or is removed from the 
target selection and engagement process, questions arise as to who (or what) 
will be held individually accountable for violations that might occur. 
The ICRC31 and some commentators32 have noted that the requirement 
of accountability for law of war violations raises serious concerns for auton-
omous weapons and weapons that rely on machine learning and artificial 
intelligence. Others have argued that such concerns are not a significant legal 
hurdle and can be resolved through a variety of methods.33 
                                                                                                                      
30. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90. 
31. ICRC, ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND MACHINE LEARNING IN ARMED CON-
FLICT, supra note 25, at 2 (“The rules of international humanitarian law are addressed to 
humans. It is humans that comply with and implement the law, and it is humans who will 
be held accountable for violations.”); see also ICRC, Towards Limits on Autonomy in Weap-
ons Systems, supra note 8; ICRC, ETHICS AND AUTONOMOUS WEAPON SYSTEMS, supra note 
10. 
32. See, e.g., Scharre, supra note 19; Roff & Moyes, supra note 22, at 1. 
33. For example, Qiang Li & Dan Xie have argued that  
In the case of full autonomy of AI weapon systems without any human control, those who 
decide to employ AI weapon systems—normally senior military commanders and civilian 
officials—bear individual criminal responsibility for any potential serious violations of IHL. 
Additionally, the States to which they belong incur State responsibility for such serious vi-
olations which could be attributable to them. 
Qiang Li & Dan Xie, Legal Regulation of AI Weapons under International Humanitarian Law: A 
Chinese Perspective, HUMANITARIAN LAW & POLICY (May 2, 2019), https://blogs.icrc.org/ 
law-and-policy/2019/05/02/ai-weapon-ihl-legal-regulation-chinese-perspective/. 
McFarland arrives at a similar conclusion, arguing that autonomy remains an exercise 
of human control and thus stating: 
[T]he behaviour of the AWS is determined by that human-written software: whether and in 
what circumstances it should initiate an attack, how it should respond to changes in its 
environment and every other aspect of its behaviour (barring malfunctions). Autonomous 
control is therefore an exercise of human control, independently of whether any human is 
in a position to oversee or intervene in the operation in real time. 
Tim McFarland, Autonomous Weapons and Human Control, HUMANITARIAN LAW & POLICY 
(July 18, 2018), https://blogs.icrc.org/law-and-policy/2018/07/18/autonomous-weapons-
and-human-control. 
Likewise, Ekelhof notes that there are numerous weapon systems where the trigger 
puller is not the person we would hold accountable for LOAC violations, such as artillery, 
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States have also expressed their views on whether accountability is a legal 
obstacle to the employment of weapons that utilize machine learning and 
artificial intelligence to select and engage targets on the battlefield, with many 
of those expressions coming as part of the CCW discussions. Some repre-
sentative expressions are set forth below. Presently, however, there is no 
consensus that the principle of accountability serves as a legal limitation on 
the development and employment of such weapons. 
A few States have expressed their belief that human involvement in se-
lecting and engaging targets is legally required. One of the strongest state-
ments of this view is from Greece. As part of the CCW process, Greece 
argued, “The use of any Weapon System in compliance with the provisions 
of International Humanitarian Law (IHL) requires a degree of human con-
trol over its use in the battlefield.”34 
Germany also views human control as legally required. In a recent state-
ment to the Group of Governmental Experts, it stated, 
 
In our view . . . the quality of human control is defined by the fact that 
humans must remain accountable for the weapons systems they use, as al-
ready stated in the “Possible Guiding Principles.” Accountability can only 
be assured as long as humans retain sufficient control over the critical func-
tions of the weapons they operate. Humans also have to maintain the ulti-
mate decision in matters of life and death. 35 
                                                                                                                      
air-delivered munitions, and nuclear weapons. The law requires those who decide and plan 
to execute an attack follow the LOAC, but that does not necessarily mean that it is the 
individual or individuals conducting the attack that we hold accountable. Accordingly, she 
argues that “meaningful human control” should be thought of as a system of “distributed 
control” to match current tactics and operational realities. See Ekelhof, supra note 7; see also 
Jessica Malekos Smith, Ethics for the AI-Enabled Warfighter – the Human ‘Warrior-in-the-Design,’ 
THE HILL (Apr. 21, 2019), https://thehill.com/opinion/cybersecurity/439898-ethics-for-
the-ai-enabled-warfighter-the-human-warrior-in-the-design. 
34. Statement by Greece, Potential Challenges Posed by Emerging Technologies in the 
Area of Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems to International Humanitarian Law, Group 
of Governmental Experts on Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems (LAWS), Geneva, Mar. 
25–29, 2019, at 1, https://www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/(httpAssets)/D1B935 
800DF5F04DC12583CC002F3DD1/$file/GGE+LAWS+STATEMENT+by+ 
GREECE-+Challenges+to+IHL.pdf [hereinafter Statement by Greece]. 
35. Statement by Germany, Group of Government Experts on Emerging Technologies 
in the Area of Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems of the Convention on Prohibition or 
Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be 
Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, Geneva, Mar. 26, 2019, 
https://www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/(httpAssets)/2B8E772610C0F552C12583C
B003A4192/$file/20190326+Statement3+Germany+GGE+LAWS.pdf. 
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Earlier German statements were less clear, calling for a “political declara-
tion” rather than arguing for a legal requirement. 36 
India also emphasizes the importance of having humans make decisions 
on targeting, but it is unclear if it views this issue as a legal requirement or 
simply a policy imperative. “Human control must be maintained over all 
weapon systems and the same should be applicable in the context of LAWS 
also. Maintaining human control during its entire life cycle including over 
critical functions is essential.”37 
                                                                                                                      
36. See General Statement by H.E. Ambassador Michael Biontino, Permanent Repre-
sentative of Germany to the Conference on Disarmament and Ambassador for Global Dis-
armament Affairs, First Meeting of the Group of Governmental Experts on Lethal Auton-
omous Weapons Systems, Geneva, 13 to 17 November 2017, at 2, ¶ 5, https://www.unog. 
ch/80256EDD006B8954/(httpAssets)/129E7BEB7128A000C1258249003146EE/$file/2
017_GGE+LAWS_Statement_Germany.pdf [hereinafter General Statement (Germany)]. 
At the heart of our proposal is the recommendation for a political declaration, which should 
affirm that State parties share the conviction that humans should continue to be able to 
make ultimate decisions with regard to the use of lethal force and should continue to exert 
sufficient control over lethal weapons systems they use. Moreover State parties should in 
our view recall that rules of international law, in particular international humanitarian law, 
are fully applicable to the development and use of LAWS (emphasis omitted). 
37. Statement by India: Further Consideration of the Human Element in the Use of 
Lethal Force; Aspects of Human Machine Interaction in the Development, Deployment 
and Use of Emerging Technologies in the Area of Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems, 
https://www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/(httpAssets)/36D216B42ED8D7A7C12583
D2003C8598/$file/5+b+26+Mar+2019+afternoon.pdf. India further stated: 
The lawfulness of weapon and weapon systems itself and whether it is qualified for use in 
an armed conflict is determined under the principles of LAW of Armed Conflict (LOAC). 
To be lawful, a weapon must satisfy all the requirements i.e. the weapon must be able to 
discriminate between military and non-military targets, it must not cause unnecessary suf-
fering and it must not be uncontrollable. 
Autonomy in critical functions of weapon systems may be viewed from two perspectives- 
one that potentially such systems would be precise and accurate in targeting, not prone to 
human error in judgement and the corollary that human interface is necessarily compliant 
on the distinction, proportionality and precautions principles of IHL in carrying out any 
attack, though such interface may not be quite safe in execution. 
Autonomy in critical functions would challenge the maintenance of combatant and com-
manders’ responsibility for decisions to use force, however such autonomy parameters may 
be made compliant to IHL during the conceptualisation, design and development of the 
system for its intended use. 
Statement by India: An Exploration of the Potential Challenges Posed by Emerging Tech-
nologies in the Area of Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems to International Humanitar-
ian Law, Mar. 26, 2019, https://www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/(httpAssets)/4C33 
0E6B0BDD4C20C12583D2003C36AF/$file/5+a+26+Mar+2019+forenoon.pdf. 
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The Indian approach is important, as many States have expressed the 
commitment to keep humans intricately involved in processes of target se-
lection and engagement, but not necessarily as a legal requirement. For ex-
ample, Brazil stated: 
 
The human element is what binds autonomous systems to Humanitarian 
International Law [HIL], since it provides a subject for accountability. In 
other words, HIL is only applicable to LAWS as long as there is someone 
to be held accountable. Therefore, the human element is not only the es-
sential concept in understanding the limits and challenges of weapons sys-
tems with autonomous functions, but also the element that ensure its com-
pliance to existing norms.38 
 
Likewise, the Canadian delegation’s opening statement to the 2018 meet-
ing of the CCW Group of Governmental Experts illustrates the tension be-
tween legal requirements and policy decisions concerning human decision 
making and lethal autonomous weapons systems. The statement asserted, 
“We believe that any legal discussion about LAWS should centre on compli-
ance with International Humanitarian Law, including the obligation for all 
States to ensure the lawfulness of their weapons, means and methods of war-
fare. These should be our constant reference points.”39 Further, it noted, 
“[a]n important part of the LAWS discussion centers on levels of human 
interaction with autonomous weapons.”40 It also noted that in the Canadian 
                                                                                                                      
38. Intervention by Brazil, 2019 Group of Governmental Experts on Lethal Autono-
mous Weapons Systems (LAWS) Mar. 25–29, 2019, at 1–2, https://www.unog.ch/80256 
EDD006B8954/(httpAssets)/EB97EA2C3DD0FA51C12583CB003AFED9/$file/Bra-
zil+GGE+LAWS+2019+-+Item+5+d+-+Human+element.pdf. 
In a separate statement, Brazil argued: 
A commander will always be ultimately accountable for violations of IHL during military 
operations under its purview. This notwithstanding, the causal relation between the deci-
sions and acts of the commander and operators and its effects on the battlefield must re-
main credible, lest we risk a dilution of the very concept of accountability as legal answera-
bility over one’s actions and choices. In other words, factual responsibility must remain 
commensurate with legal accountability, otherwise the human commander or operator ends 
up as a mere legal scapegoat in case anything goes wrong, instead of an agent which takes 
consequential decisions, for good or bad, and responds for them. 
Statement by Brazil, supra note 26, at 1. 
39. Opening Statement by Canada at Second Meeting of the Group of Governmental 
Experts on Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems (LAWS), Apr. 9–13, 2018, 
https://www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/(httpAssets)/86612887B010EB33C1258272
0056F0C6/$file/2018_LAWSGeneralExchange_Canada.pdf. 
40. Id.  
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National Defense Policy, the Canadian Armed Forces committed to “main-
tain appropriate human involvement in the use of military capabilities that 
can exert lethal force.”41 
While recognizing human involvement as important in the targeting pro-
cess, many States have taken the view that the desired human involvement 
can come at many and varied points in the weapons development and em-
ployment process. For example, Israel takes the view that human involve-
ment does not necessarily require a human to pull the trigger, or even be 
involved in the targeting decision at the time of engagement.42 Similarly, the 
Netherlands argues that human involvement is legally required but allows 
that such involvement may come at various stages in the targeting process.43 
                                                                                                                      
41. MINISTER OF NATIONAL DEFENCE, STRONG SECURE ENGAGED: CANADA’S DE-
FENCE POLICY 72 (2017).  
42. See Statement by Mr. Asaf Segev, Arms Control Department, Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, Israel at Meeting of the Group of Governmental Experts on Emerging Technolo-
gies in the Area of Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems, Mar. 26, 2019,  
https://www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/(httpAssets)/6E67051E5B3945FEC12583E
500357899/$file/CCW+-+GGE+LAWS+-+Israel+intervention+-+Human+Machine+ 
Interface+-+26+March+2019.pdf. 
Humans will always be in charge of any process to develop and acquire LAWS, including 
the various phases of the research, development, programming, testing, technical and legal 
review, and approval of such systems. During these phases, humans will determine how 
LAWS will operate. Ultimately, it is the responsibility of the humans involved that the sys-
tem’s use will be lawful.  
As with any other weapon, the persons involved would take into account the operational 
scenarios, environments and circumstances in which the weapon is intended to be em-
ployed, and during development they must ensure that the algorithms and technical capa-
bilities of the weapon make it suitable for use in these circumstances. This applies also to 
the legal aspect. Thus, it should be ensured that, under the circumstances in which the 
weapon is intended to be used, and in the way it would be authorized to be used, its future 
employment would comply with the Laws of Armed Conflict. As any other weapon, LAWS 
could be authorized for use subject to limitations and conditions. 
The human who makes the decision to use the weapon is responsible that the use would 
comply with the Laws of Armed Conflict. If deemed necessary in order to meet the legal 
requirements, the human should limit the system’s operation by, for example, restricting the 
system’s operation to a specific perimeter or during a limited timeframe. 
43. Sandra de Jonogh, Policy Officer, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Statement of the 
Netherlands delivered at the Group of Experts on LAWS, Apr. 26, 2019, 
https://www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/(httpAssets)/164DD121FDC25A0BC1258
3CB003A99C2/$file/5b+NL+Statement+Human+Element-final.pdf. 
The Netherlands is of the view that autonomous weapon systems should remain under 
meaningful human control to ensure their compliance with international law. After all, only 
humans can be held accountable, and therefore should have meaningful control over deci-
sions on the use of force. In our view, meaningful human control should be understood 
within the context of design, development and operational use of autonomous weapons. 
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The United States takes a similar view in the Department of Defense’s Law 
of War Manual, which states,  
 
The law of war rules on conducting attacks . . . impose obligations on per-
sons. These rules do not impose obligations on the weapons themselves; 
of course, an inanimate object could not assume an ‘obligation’ in any 
event. . . . The law of war does not require weapons to make legal determi-
nations, even if the weapon (e.g., through computers, software, and sen-
sors) may be characterized as capable of making factual determinations, 
such as whether to fire the weapon or to select and engage a target. . . . 
Rather, it is persons who must comply with the law of war.44 
 
The U.S. Department of Defense has also issued Directive 3000.09, Au-
tonomy in Weapon Systems, which “[e]stablishes DoD policy and assigns 
responsibilities for the development and use of autonomous and semi-au-
tonomous functions in weapon systems, including manned and unmanned 
platforms.”45 The Directive sets forth the appropriate level of human judg-
ment standard, stating, “It is DoD policy that [a]utonomous and semi-au-
tonomous weapon systems shall be designed to allow commanders and op-
erators to exercise appropriate levels of human judgment over the use of 
force.”46 It further establishes that individuals who employ lethal autono-
mous weapons systems must do so under appropriate legal rules: “Persons 
who authorize the use of, direct the use of, or operate autonomous and sem-
iautonomous weapon systems must do so with appropriate care and in ac-
cordance with the law of war, applicable treaties, weapon system safety rules, 
and applicable rules of engagement (ROE).”47 
As noted in a 2019 Congressional Research Service publication, U.S. pol-
icy “does not require manual human ‘control’ of the weapon system, as is 
often reported, but rather broader human involvement in decisions about 
                                                                                                                      
The targeting cycle allows for human control in relation to a wide variety of tasks, such as 
the determination of end-states and objectives, target development, weapon selection, as-
sessment of potential collateral damage, determination of the weapon’s operational bound-
aries in time and space, and the assessment of the effectiveness and lawfulness of the en-
gagement after deployment. 
44. DOD LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 27, § 6.5.9.3. 
45. U.S. Department of Defense, Directive 3000.09, Autonomy in Weapon Systems ¶ 
1(a) (2012) (Incorporating Change 1, May 8, 2017), https://www.esd.whs.mil/Portals/54/ 
Documents/DD/issuances/dodd/300009p.pdf [hereinafter DoD Directive 3000.09]. 
46. Id. ¶ 4(a). 
47. Id. ¶ 4(b). 
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how, when, where, and why the weapon will be employed.”48 Further, a 2018 
U.S. white paper submitted as part of the CCW process argues that the term 
“appropriate” with respect to “appropriate levels of human judgment” is 
flexible and its meaning context dependent, stating: 
 
[Appropriate] is a flexible term that reflects the fact that there is not a fixed, 
one size-fits-all level of human judgment that should be applied to every con-
text. What is “appropriate” can differ across weapon systems, domains of war-
fare, types of warfare, operational contexts, and even across different functions 
in a weapon system. Some functions might be better performed by a computer 
than a human being, while other functions should be performed by humans.49 
 
Scholars have noted a similar trend among States. For example, Rebecca 
Crootof observes, 
 
there is no consensus as to what meaningful human control actually re-
quires. State X might define meaningful human control to require informed 
human approval of each possible action of a given weapon system (main-
taining a human being―in the loop); State Y might understand it as the 
ability of a human operator to oversee and veto a weapon system’s actions 
(having a human being―on the loop); and State Z might view the original 
programming alone as providing sufficiently meaningful human control 
(allowing human beings to be―off the loop).50 
 
In a recent submission to the CCW Group of Governmental Experts, 
the United Kingdom noted its views on this topic. First, in relation to the 
issue of accountability discussed above, the United Kingdom clearly ex-
presses its view that accountability does not present an issue that should have 
any impact on the fielding of autonomous weapon systems: 
 
                                                                                                                      
48. KELLEY M. SAYLER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., IF11150, DEFENSE PRIMER: U.S. 
POLICY ON LETHAL AUTONOMOUS WEAPON SYSTEMS (2019), https://www.a51.nl/sites/ 
default/files/pdf/IF11150.pdf. 
49. United States, Human-Machine Interaction in the Development, Deployment and 
Use of Emerging Technologies in the Area of Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems ¶¶ 8, 
9, U.N. Doc. CCW/GGE.e/2018/WP.4, Aug. 28, 2018, https://www.unog.ch/80256 
EDD006B8954/(httpAssets)/D1A2BA4B7B71D29FC12582F6004386EF/$file/2018_G
GE+LAWS_August_Working+Paper_US.pdf. 
50. Rebecca Crootof, A Meaningful Floor for “Meaningful Human Control”, 30 TEMPLE IN-
TERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW JOURNAL 53, 54 (2016). 
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It is the UKs view that accountability can never be delegated to a machine 
or system; should a violation of IHL result from the operation of a weapon 
or weapon system, processes are already in place to conduct appropriate 
investigations and, if applicable, apportion responsibility. Legal accounta-
bility will always devolve to a human being, never a machine – increasing 
autonomy in weapons or weapons systems does not therefore present the 
risk of an accountability gap.51 
 
Then, while acknowledging that in most circumstances human judgment 
“currently exceeds that of machines,” the United Kingdom allowed that cer-
tain situations already exist where machines make more accurate decisions 
than humans do. 
 
Within tightly defined circumstances and in response to a specific problem, 
machines may make more accurate decisions than a human; outside of 
these circumstances, the ability of a human to apply experience and judge-
ment to a new situation currently exceeds that of machines. We have ex-
plored such issues in our Joint Concept Note on Human Machine Teaming 
and in the UK’s 2018 working paper. The effective teaming of human and 
machine can improve capability, accuracy, diligence and speed of decision, 
whilst maintaining and potentially enhancing confidence in adherence to 
IHL.52 
 
Finally, the United Kingdom argued that even an acceptance of human dis-
cretion as a principle does not amount to a prohibition on even fully auton-
omous weapon systems as human discretion and input can be manifested in 
various ways and at various times throughout the “operational lifecycle” of 
a weapons system. 
 
As we pointed out in our intervention on characterisation yesterday, direct 
human involvement in every detailed action of a system or platform may 
not be practical or desirable under all circumstances. Instead a human-cen-
tred approach to autonomous technologies must take into account the op-
erational context as well as the capabilities and limitations of the personnel 
deploying the weapon system. The way in which a weapon is developed 
and used may differ dramatically depending on whether it is to be deployed 
in a land, air or maritime environment and according to considerations 
such as the type of target it is to be deployed against, duration and distance 
                                                                                                                      
51. UK Statement, supra note 20, at 1. 
52. Id. at 2–3. 
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over which the system may be required to operate and potential impact on 
civilians and civilian infrastructure. 
 
Focusing solely on specific—or ‘critical’—functions or activity in the 
lifecycle of a weapon is unlikely to be sufficient to ensure there is human 
control. As was pointed out this morning, such functions may relate to 
navigation, survivability or situational awareness such as sensing and avoid-
ing hazards. They may be indirectly linked to the application of lethal force, 
such as acquisition of a target originated by a human operator or com-
mander. Cumulatively, all such functions will support a system’s ability to 
deliver the defined effect intended by the human agent – including the ap-
plication of lethal force. This makes regulation or characterisation by func-
tion difficult and potentially unhelpful. Rather, it is the cumulative effect 
of multiple safeguards across the development and operational lifecycle 
that establish human control of weapon systems. Therefore, human con-
trol should be considered and exercised throughout this lifecycle and in a 
way that is appropriate to the operational context.53 
 
This obvious lack of consensus as to what human control even means, 
and when or how it should be applied, reflects deeper divisions among States 
concerning the actual content of the law. Deep-seated differences remain in 
how States view the issue of the legal requirement for human control. A 
recent statement by General Counsel Ney, which reiterates the U.S. position 
rejecting efforts to ban LAWS or establish human control as a binding legal 
principle, illustrates this point. 
 
We discussed our written DoD policy directive on autonomy in weapon 
systems, which “[e]stablishes guidelines designed to minimize the proba-
bility of consequences of failures in autonomous and semi-autonomous 
weapons systems that could lead to unintended engagements.” The United 
States has sought, in a series of working papers, to articulate how we believe 
that existing law of war requirements apply to the use of autonomy in 
weapon systems. We have also shared our approach of using law of war 
principles, when no more specific rule applies, to guide our decision mak-
ing on emerging technologies. 
 
                                                                                                                      
53. UK Mission Geneva, Statement at Meeting of Group of Governmental Experts on 
Emerging Technologies in the Area of Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems, Mar. 25–29, 
2019, https://www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/(httpAssets)/85A4AA89AFCFD316 
C12583D3003EAB3E/$file/20190318-5(d)_HMI_Statement.pdf. 
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I would contrast the U.S. approach with that of other GGE delegations. 
Some delegations and many NGOs approach this issue from the perspec-
tive of seeking to promulgate a new rule. Some are advocating a ban on 
lethal autonomous weapons systems (LAWS). Some are advocating a new 
principle of “human control” over weapon systems. 
 
These efforts seem to us to be based on incorrect factual and legal prem-
ises. Many delegations are assuming that autonomy means less control or 
that the development of an autonomous function in a weapon system en-
tails a delegation of decision-making to a machine. 
 
As we have explained in working papers and interventions, we believe these 
assumptions are inaccurate. As a factual matter, the use of autonomy in 
weapon systems has improved the degree of control that human beings 
exercise over the use of force.54 
 
In attacking the underlying “incorrect” assumptions upon which many States 
are making their decisions, the United States argues that uses of artificial 
intelligence and autonomy will make weapon systems capable of greater 
speed, accuracy, and precision. This increased capability, the United States 
argues, will result in greater protections for the civilian population. 
 
The advantage of Artificial Intelligence and other autonomy-related emerg-
ing technologies is the use of software or machine control of the system 
rather than manual control by a human being. These technologies can pro-
duce greater accuracy, precision, and speed in weapon systems. These tech-
nologies can produce entirely new capabilities that are otherwise impossi-
ble. For example, the Counter-Rocket Artillery and Mortar System can fire 
precisely at incoming projectiles and disable them; a human gunner 
couldn’t do that manually. 
 
Moreover, whether a decision is “delegated” in some sense to a machine 
has more to do with how the weapon is used than whether the weapon 
system itself has an autonomous function. A weapon with a function for 
selecting and engaging targets can be used without delegating any decision-
making to the machine, in the sense of substituting the human’s decision 
with the machine’s decision. Instead, the addition of autonomous or 
“smart” capabilities can allow weapons to “lock on” to targets like enemy 
                                                                                                                      
54. Ney, Keynote Address, supra note 27. 
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tanks, warships, or aircraft, to better effectuate the intent of the command-
ers and operators, and reduce the risk of harm to civilians.55 
 
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, Ney stressed that what matters most 
is LOAC compliance and that the misplaced emphasis on human control 
may actually undercut this objective. 
 
In the U.S. perspective, there is nothing intrinsically valuable about manu-
ally operating a weapon system as opposed to operating it with an autono-
mous function. For example, existing law of war treaties do not seek to 
enhance “human control” as such. Rather, these treaties seek, among other 
things, to ensure the use of weapons consistent with the fundamental prin-
ciples of distinction and proportionality, and with the obligation to take 
feasible precautions for the protection of the civilian population. Although 
“human control” can be a useful means in implementing these principles, 
“human control” as such is not, and should not be, an end in itself. In our 
view, we should not be developing novel principles that stigmatize the use 
of emerging technologies, when these technologies could significantly en-
hance how the existing principles of the law of war are implemented in 
military operations.56 
 
The recounting of State views leaves little sense of what human account-
ability means, how it would be determined, and to what extent it is legally 
required as a measure of accountability. While almost everyone agrees that 
some form of human control is preferred, and some believe it is required, 
such variance in State views leaves little clarity as to what human accounta-
bility looks like and makes it clear that States do not agree that such a legal 
requirement currently exists. Therefore, statements declaring, “[A] weapon 
system beyond human control would be unlawful by its very nature,”57 add 
little substance to the discussion until States can either come to agreement 
or develop law through practice. 
Perhaps, at some future point, States will reach a consensus on how to 
define and ensure accountability in autonomous systems. However, it is cer-
tainly premature to pre-decide that issue by stating the potential difficulty in 
establishing human accountability precludes the researching, developing, and 
employing of autonomous weapon systems. 
 
                                                                                                                      
55. Id. 
56. Id. 
57. ICRC, Towards Limits on Autonomy in Weapons Systems, supra note 8. 
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D. Predictability 
 
Predictability has also been raised as a concern with respect to autono-
mous weapons and weapon systems that will utilize artificial intelligence. 
For example, the ICRC has argued, “AI and machine-learning software 
– specifically of the type developed for ‘automatic target recognition’ – 
could form the basis of future autonomous weapon systems, bringing a 
new dimension of unpredictability to these weapons, as well as concerns 
about lack of explainability and bias . . . .”58 It urged States to focus on 
“[w]hat level of predictability – in terms of its functioning and the con-
sequences of its use – and reliability – in terms of the likelihood of failure 
or malfunction – is required” with respect to autonomy in weapon sys-
tems.59 Some scholars have also raised a potential lack of predictability as a 
legal concern.60 
States have commented less on this concern than on the issues of human 
control and accountability. Nonetheless, some States have addressed this is-
sue, albeit indirectly. For example, Brazil expressed concerns about how dis-
criminatory bias might affect targeting decisions in autonomous systems: 
 
A combatant can be incapacitated or surrender at a moment’s notice; the 
assessment of proportionality between the intended military goal and risks 
posed to civilians in an operation cannot be ascribed to computational cal-
culations; the risk of unacceptable discriminatory bias embedded in da-
tasets used to inform machine decision-making is all too real to be dis-
carded or considered a minor glitch to be corrected by trial and error.61 
 
Greece has also addressed the issue, but pointed to weapons reviews as the 
means to resolve this potential problem:  
 
In this context, the main concerns arising from the potential development and 
use of LAWS revolves around their predictability and reliability during the op-
erational stage. Therefore, it is of utmost importance to ensure that any new 
                                                                                                                      
58. ICRC, ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND MACHINE LEARNING IN ARMED CON-
FLICT, supra note 25, at 3 (emphasis omitted). 
59. Id. (emphasis omitted). 
60. See, e.g., Suresh Venkatasubramanian, Structural Disconnects between Algorithmic Decision-
making and the Law, HUMANITARIAN LAW & POLICY (Apr. 25, 2019), https://blogs.icrc.org/ 
law-and-policy/2019/04/25/structural-disconnects-algorithmic-decision-making-law/; see 
also Goussac, supra note 8. 
61. Statement by Brazil, supra note 26. 
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weapon with high degree of autonomy on its critical functions will be tested 
during its development stage in all foreseeable scenarios of its use.62 
 
As the Greek delegation noted, the issue of predictability seems to be 
one of reliability as to whether the weapon systems will apply the LOAC 
correctly in all situations. Predictability and reliability are particular concerns 
for weapons that “learn” and then “select” and “target” based on that assim-
ilated data without further input from humans. However, the delegation 
noted that such concerns would be resolved within the normal legal review 
process discussed below. In other words, a thorough and complete weapons 
review will address the issue of predictability. 
 
E. Weapons Reviews 
 
The review of “any new weapon” is a process by which States review weap-
ons to ensure their intended use complies with the LOAC. Weapons that 
have undergone such a review are presumed legal and can be employed by 
the State’s armed forces. 
State Parties to AP I have a legal obligation to conduct a legal review on 
new weapons and other means and methods of warfare.63 The United States 
also conducts weapons reviews, albeit as a matter of policy since it is not a 
party to AP I.64 Despite these legal obligations and policy constraints, the 
ICRC acknowledges that “only a limited number of States are known to have 
put in place mechanisms or procedures to conduct legal reviews of weap-
ons”65 This lack of practice and uniformity has led some commentators to 
conclude that a uniform standard may not be possible with respect to reviews 
of weapons incorporating machine learning and artificial intelligence.66 
                                                                                                                      
62. Statement by Greece, supra note 34, at 2. 
63. AP I, supra note 6, art. 36. 
64. U.S. Department of Defense, Directive 5000.01, The Defense Acquisition System 
(2003) (Incorporating Change 2, Aug. 31, 2018), https://www.esd.whs.mil/Portals/54/ 
Documents/DD/issuances/dodd/500001p.pdf [hereinafter DoD Directive 5000.01]; 
DOD LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 27, § 6.2. 
65. INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, A GUIDE TO THE LEGAL RE-
VIEW OF NEW WEAPONS, MEANS AND METHODS OF WARFARE 5 (2006), https://www. 
icrc.org/en/doc/assets/files/other/icrc_002_0902.pdf. 
66. Dustin A. Lewis, Legal Reviews of Weapons, Means and Methods of Warfare Involving Ar-
tificial Intelligence: 16 Elements to Consider, HUMANITARIAN LAW & POLICY (Mar. 21, 2019), 
https://blogs.icrc.org/law-and-policy/2019/03/21/legal-reviews-weapons-means-meth-
ods-warfare-artificial-intelligence-16-elements-consider/. “Such differential approaches as 
to what constitutes lawful and unlawful conduct prevent normative uniformity and legal 
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Despite the lack of universality of the weapons review, at least some of 
the States with the current technological capability to develop and employ 
autonomous weapons (such as the United States and the United Kingdom) 
are among the States with a robust and well-respected weapons review pro-
cess. To encourage and assist States, the ICRC has issued a very helpful guide 
on the conduct of weapons reviews,67 which would certainly apply to weap-
ons employing machine learning or artificial intelligence. In that publication, 
the ICRC recommends that States follow the basic elements of a weapons 
review under Article 36 of AP I. 
 
The first step is to determine whether employment of the particular 
weapon or means of warfare under review is prohibited or restricted by a 
treaty which binds the reviewing State or by customary international law. 
If there is no such specific prohibition, the next step is to determine 
whether employment of the weapon or means of warfare under review and 
the normal or expected methods by which it is to be used would comply 
with the general rules applicable to all weapons, means and methods of 
warfare found in Additional Protocol I and other treaties that bind the re-
viewing State or in customary international law. In the absence of relevant 
treaty or customary rules, the reviewing authority should consider the pro-
posed weapon in light of the principles of humanity and the dictates of 
public conscience.68 
 
Netta Goussac, an ICRC legal advisor, has written specifically concerning 
legal reviews on new autonomous weapons, arguing,  
 
Because software is more readily modified than physical systems, the legal 
review requirement may arise more frequently in weapon systems relying 
on AI. Systems that learn from their environment and thereby change their 
functioning after activation would present a particular concern. In effect, a 
legal review conducted before the weapon is introduced would become in-
valid upon its deployment.69 
 
Others have also voiced their views on the application of weapons re-
views to weapons that employ machine learning and artificial intelligence. Xi 
                                                                                                                      
universality and thereby preclude the establishment of a comprehensive set of agreed pri-
mary legal norms against which all weapons, means or methods of warfare must be re-
viewed.” 
67. INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, supra note 65. 
68. Id. at 11. 
69. Goussac, supra note 8. 
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and Lie state, “In all circumstances, they must be employed in accordance 
with the principles and rules of IHL,”70 including the weapons review pro-
cess of Article 36. 
States have also expressed views on the applicability of weapons reviews 
to autonomous weapon systems and systems that use machine learning or 
artificial intelligence. For example, in conjunction with the CCW process, 
Brazil states, “[it] acknowledges the importance of weapons reviews in order 
to support compliance with IHL in the use of novel weapons systems, both 
under Article 36 of Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions and as a corollary 
of customary international law.”71 Greece,72 the Netherlands,73 the United 
Kingdom,74 and the European Union have made similar statements.75 
The United States has also expressed a view on the requirement to con-
duct a weapons review on weapons that use machine learning and artificial 
intelligence. In general, the DoD Law of War Manual recognizes U.S. practice 
to conduct weapons reviews, outlines the content of those reviews, and fo-
cuses on three questions to determine the lawfulness of a weapon: (1) 
“whether the weapon’s intended use is calculated to cause superfluous in-
jury”; (2) “whether the weapon is inherently indiscriminate”; and (3) 
“whether the weapon falls within a class of weapons that has been specifi-
cally prohibited.”76 Moreover, even if the weapon is not prohibited, the 
weapons review should consider whether there are any additional legal re-
strictions pertaining to this type of weapon or the weapon’s intended use.77 
If any additional restrictions exist, the intended concept of employment 
should be reviewed to ensure consistency with these restrictions.78 
More specifically, the DoD Directive addressing autonomy in weapons 
systems provides “rigorous verification and validation and realistic system 
development and operations test and evaluation” to ensure the weapons 
“function as anticipated in realistic operational environments,” complete en-
gagement as planned or terminate the engagement, and are resistant to un-
authorized external control.79 The directive goes on to mandate that a legal 
                                                                                                                      
70. Li & Xie, supra note 33. 
71. Statement by Brazil, supra note 26. 
72. Statement by Greece, supra note 34, at 2. 
73. Statement of the Netherlands, supra note 15. 
74. UK Statement, supra note 20. 
75. EU Statement, supra note 26. 
76. DOD LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 27, § 6.2.2. 
77. Id. 
78. Id. 
79. DoD Directive 3000.09, supra note 45, ¶ 4(a). 
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review be conducted of autonomous weapon systems used to apply lethal or 
non-lethal, kinetic, or non-kinetic force to ensure compliance with domestic 
law, treaties, customary international law, and the LOAC.80 
The applicability of a weapons review to emerging technologies such as 
weapons that employ machine learning or artificial intelligence seems to be 
accepted by a growing number of countries and the existence of a treaty-
based obligation for Parties to AP I is uncontested. What that review would 
encompass is a matter of more detailed discussion, as illustrated by the ob-
vious differences between what the ICRC suggests and the U.S. policy. 
However, a thorough and well-designed weapons review will force States 
to ensure that any development or employment of weapons that use auton-
omous systems to select and engage targets comply with all aspects of the 
LOAC. Recognizing the unique aspects of weapons that use machine learn-
ing or artificial intelligence, States would have to design their review to ac-
count for the concerns raised about these weapon systems. As with all new 
technologies, the purpose of the weapons review is to apply the principles 
of the LOAC to the intended use of the weapon and to ensure that it fully 
complies with legal principles such as distinction and proportionality. For 
the review to be legally sufficient, it would have to ensure that the weapon 
system performs in accordance with the LOAC in all situations in which it 
is intended to be employed. Having acknowledged this point does not mean, 
however, that a new version of a weapons review is needed. Rather, the 
standard of a weapons review remains constant, but the rigor of the testing, 
evaluation, and analysis might have to increase to ensure the weapon system 
meets the generally accepted requirements of a weapons review. 
Such a review will satisfy the concerns of not only predictability, but will 
also ensure that whatever the means of human control—or lack thereof—it 
does not prevent the autonomous system from applying force in compliance 
with the LOAC. Indeed, the current concerns and claims of inferred illegality 
should dissolve in the face of a thorough and rigorous weapons review. 
Despite the urging of nongovernmental organizations and some schol-
ars, there is a clear lack of consensus among States concerning the legal re-
quirement for human decision making in selecting and engaging targets. This 
lack of consensus continues despite arguments based on a potential lack of 
                                                                                                                      
80. Id. ¶ 4(c). It does so by directing that such systems must undergo the weapons 
review process required by DoD Directive 5000.01. See DoD Directive 5000.01, supra note 
61, at 7 (noting that ¶ E1.1.15 of Enclosure 1 details legal compliance requirements for the 
DoD acquisition and procurement process). 
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accountability and possible difficulties with predictability in the use of weap-
ons employing machine learning or artificial intelligence. 
Until the achievement of a consensus, there is no legal basis for banning 
or even limiting the development or employment of autonomous weapons 
systems. Hence, States are free to continue to research and develop such 
systems, with the commitment to review each system at appropriate stages 
in the development and employment process to ensure that the weapon can 
fully comply with all LOAC requirements. 
 
IV. STATES SHOULD CONTINUE TO RESEARCH AND DEVELOP   
EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES 
 
Given the lack of consensus on the legal regulations for the use of machine 
learning and artificial intelligence in weapon systems, there is currently no 
basis for arguing that the law prevents the research, development, and em-
ployment of these systems. Further, the attempts to declare them illegal are 
counterproductive. Declaring these weapons illegal now would prevent 
States from researching and developing technologies that may lead to greater 
LOAC compliance. Such restriction would certainly not result in long-term 
benefits to participants in and victims of armed conflict. 
Some States have recognized the counterproductive nature of this ap-
proach. For example, Germany’s general statement to the 2017 meeting of 
the Group of Governmental Experts emphasized the prematurity of the lim-
itation on emerging technologies. As Michael Biontino argued, “Discussing 
the possibility of an all-encompassing regulation or even a ban as proposed 
by some [S]tates and civil society organisations is in our view premature at 
this point. These legal questions should be reconsidered at a later stage, as 
the technology of LAWS evolves.”81 
As the international community continues to seek consensus on the way 
forward, and as technology continues to evolve, several issues deserve in-
creased attention. These issues include determining whether the LOAC re-
quires the “best application possible” or the “best application humanly pos-
sible,” the basis upon which to compare human and autonomous “deci-
sions,” and, assuming machine learning or artificial intelligence can increase 
compliance with the LOAC, whether there is a legal obligation to employ 
these capabilities. 
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A. “Best Application Possible” or “Best Application Humanly Possible” 
 
As previously mentioned, the ICRC has asserted that the LOAC requires 
human involvement in the selection and engagement of targets. Goussac ar-
gues, “Human control in the use of weapon systems is inherently required 
by the rules of IHL, notably the rules of distinction, proportionality and pre-
cautions in attack.”82 Tim McFarland offered a countering view, stating: 
 
[E]xercising meaningful human control means employing whatever 
measures are necessary, whether human or technical, to ensure that an op-
eration involving an AWS is completed in accordance with a commander’s 
intent and with all applicable legal, ethical and other constraints. That 
means ensuring that autonomous systems are employed only to the extent 
that they can be shown to operate in a way which allows all those con-
straints to be met, and may or may not require that a human remain in or 
on the loop.83 
 
State acceptance of the ICRC view that only humans can exercise the 
critical elements of the LOAC has far-reaching consequences. For example, 
unlike the position urged by the German delegation calling for patience in 
regulation, if it is accepted as a matter of law that the legal standard in the 
LOAC is the “best application humanly possible,” then any emerging tech-
nology would have to remain subject to human control, including the recog-
nition that these decisions will continue to be subject to human oversight 
and potential human error. This approach would also affect the research and 
development of autonomous weapons systems. There would be no reason 
to conduct research into and develop the capabilities of weapon systems that 
utilize machine learning or artificial intelligence as an alternative to human 
decision making because those weapons could never be deployed. The im-
pacts on the development of artificial intelligence and machine learning 
would be profound. For example, this approach would likely limit any po-
tential benefits, including possible increased compliance, which might accrue 
from these emerging technologies. As long as the possibility remains that as 
technology progresses, autonomous systems or systems utilizing machine 
                                                                                                                      
82. Goussac, supra note 8 (“Exactly the type and degree of human control over an 
autonomous weapon system required for legal compatibility (and ethical acceptability) is 
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83. McFarland, supra note 33. 
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learning and artificial intelligence may outperform humans, it is counterpro-
ductive to remove that option from our future. 
If, on the other hand, the LOAC requires the “best application possible” 
of the law,84 meaning the most legally compliant application of the LOAC, 
the emphasis will be directed more at the result of the decision as opposed 
to who makes the decision. In this way, rather than a focus on accountability 
and ensuring the possibility of prosecution when mistakes occur, the focus 
will be on limiting mistakes. 
Under a “best application possible” approach, if the international com-
munity has any belief that autonomous weapons—or artificial intelligence or 
weapons using machine learning—can factually apply force in a way that in 
at least some circumstances would result in better protections for humans, 
then research, development, and experimentation should continue. Instead 
of limiting progress, the international community should be encouraging the 
development of autonomous weapons that apply machine learning or artifi-
cial intelligence on the battlefield in the anticipation (or even hope) that they 
might be able to apply the legal requirements of IHL in a way that results in 
greater protections for individuals affected by armed conflict. 
 
B. The Comparative Standard of Review 
 
One of the most difficult issues in the “best application humanly possible” 
or “best application possible” debate is deciding how to quantify the analysis 
the debate engenders. What does “best” mean? How does the international 
community assess how well and how poorly humans make decisions? What 
is the comparative basis for deciding if weapons using artificial intelligence 
or machine learning can achieve a “better” application of the LOAC? 
There does not appear to be any national or international methodology 
for accurately assessing overall performance in applying the LOAC. One 
measure might be the number of national and international investigations or 
prosecutions for violations. Another measure might be the number of alle-
gations raised, including those raised by non-State sources. While recent 
work done in this area seems to indicate that there are more civilian deaths 
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resulting from armed conflict than States initially claim,85 it is unclear that 
raw data such as deaths would be dispositive in determining LOAC compli-
ance. Such raw data—particularly without context—would not account for 
the increases and decreases in hostility in any given military operation over 
time or the environment of the hostilities such as urban or rural. In times of 
greater fighting intensity, particularly in urban environments, civilian casual-
ties are likely to increase regardless of compliance with the LOAC. 
Identifying how to formulate and apply this comparative standard of re-
view has significant outcomes. If the standard is that machine learning or 
artificial intelligence systems must achieve a perfect or near-perfect applica-
tion of the LOAC, then certain types of autonomous capabilities need not 
be researched and developed. However, if the standard is that the weapon 
system selecting and engaging targets must be able to apply the law in a way 
that produces even one less civilian casualty than systems based on human 
decision making, a number of possible autonomous weapons that utilize ma-
chine learning and artificial intelligence without real-time human involve-
ment may now be capable of development and deployment. 
 
C. A Legal Requirement for Machine Learning and Artificial Intelligence 
 
One final consideration is a natural outgrowth of the prior discussion. If 
weapon systems utilizing machine learning and artificial intelligence prove to 
be more capable of LOAC compliance or have the potential to become so, 
and the legal requirement is “best application possible,” States may have a 
legal obligation to develop and employ such systems. As Jenks and Liivoja 
concluded, “Arguably, there would be a point where the constant care obli-
gation to spare the civilian population, civilians and civilian objects would 
require States that have such vehicles to use them.”86 
While such an assertion is even more premature than the assertion that 
machine learning and artificial intelligence will never be capable of correctly 
applying the LOAC, the legal issue raised is worthy of discussion. The gen-
eral march of technology has made weapons much more destructive, and 
will undoubtedly continue to do so. However, improved technology has also 
exponentially increased the possibilities of compliance through more exact-
ing distinction and proportionality assessments. Here, one obvious example 
                                                                                                                      
85. See, e.g., Larry Lewis & Ryan Goodman, Civilian Casualties: We Need Better Estimates—
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is the use of precision-guided munitions rather than iron bombs, better 
known as “dumb bombs.” As improved technology has made better LOAC 
compliance possible, the pressure to apply that technology has increased. 
Ultimately, if emerging technologies can provide ways to achieve in-
creased compliance with the LOAC, States should at least be encouraged to 
pursue them and, potentially, depending on issues such as feasibility, be re-
quired to employ them. Regardless of which of these two approaches is 
taken, the international community should certainly not prevent or prohibit 
emerging technologies that may eventually achieve this benefit. 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
 
It is clear that States have not yet come to a consensus on the issue of the 
legal role of human decision making in LOAC compliance. Given that lack 
of consensus, one can only conclude that the law does not currently require 
a human decision for selecting and engaging targets to be lawful. Though the 
international community may come to such a decision, it has not yet done 
so. The current legal standard for weapon systems, therefore, including those 
currently employing machine learning and those that will employ machine 
learning and artificial intelligence in the future, is whether or not that system 
can apply the traditional principles of the LOAC, including minimizing civil-
ian deaths and injury and damage to civilian objects. 
Further, because the future capabilities of machine learning and artificial 
intelligence are still an open question, those technologies should be re-
searched and developed with the potential of being fully implemented by 
States. Emerging technologies offer the promise of not only greater compli-
ance with existing norms and processes, but also increased opportunities to 
provide protections in new and creative ways in the future. 
Lastly, as the international community recognizes the benefits offered by 
emerging technologies, incentives to research and develop such technologies 
should be encouraged. Ultimately, the legal standard for weapon systems us-
ing machine learning and artificial intelligence should be the “best applica-
tion possible” rather than the “best application humanly possible.” Interna-
tional focus on the decisions of warfare, rather than the decisionmakers, will 
benefit all concerned and result in greater protections for the participants in 
and the victims of armed conflict. 
 
